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1 Introduction
The UK, the US and many other countries have put in place welfare programs subsidizing the
wages of low earning individuals and specifically lone mothers, alongside other income support
measures.1 Empirical analysis to date has focussed on the short run employment implications
of such programs and has not studied their broader long-term impact. This is an important
omission because such programs have multiple e↵ects on careers and social welfare: on the
one hand they change the incentives to obtain education, to work and to accumulate human
capital and savings, and on the other hand they o↵er potentially valuable (partial) insurance
against labor market shocks. We develop an empirical framework for education and life-cycle
labor supply that allows us to address these issues.
At their core, in-work benefits2 are a means of transferring income towards low income families
conditional on working, incentivizing work and avoiding poverty traps implied by excessive
(and often above 100%) marginal tax rates. The schemes are generally designed as a subsidy
to working, frequently dependent on family composition and particularly on the presence of
children. In the UK they are also conditional on a minimum level of hours worked. Our focus
is on female careers and how they might be a↵ected by these welfare programs because most
of the associated reforms have been primarily relevant for women with children. Moreover,
the consensus view is that women are most responsive to incentives.3 In addition, over their
life-cycle a sizable proportion of women become single mothers, vulnerable to poverty (see
Blundell and Hoynes, 2004, for example). For them, allowing for the e↵ects of human capital
accumulation is particularly important because of the career interruptions and the often loose
labor market attachment that the programs we consider attempt to address. These features
may be important sources of male-female wage di↵erentials and, more importantly for the aim
of our study, they may propagate the longer term e↵ects of welfare benefits and be an crucial
determinant of the incentives to work.4 Indeed, a motivation for tax credits is to preserve the
labour market attachment of lower skill mothers and to prevent skill depreciation.
Several empirical and theoretical studies have contributed to our understanding of the impacts
1see Browne and Roantree (2012) for the UK reforms.
2Throughout the paper we use interchangeably the terms “benefits”, “welfare” and “welfare programs” to
denote government transfers to lower income individuals. We also refer to “welfare e↵ects” or “social welfare”
when discussing impacts on total utility of a group.
3See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2012) for surveys of the evidence.
4See Shaw (1989), Imai and Keane (2004) and Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (2003).
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of in-work benefits. Most of the attention has been on how they a↵ect work incentives and
labour supply. In a seminal paper, Saez (2002) showed that the optimal design of in-work ben-
efits depends on how responsive individuals are at the intensive (hours of work) and extensive
(whether to work) margins. Hotz and Scholz (2003) review the literature on the e↵ects of the
Earned Income Tax Credit, the main US transfer scheme to the (working) poor. Card and
Robins (2005) and Card and Hyslop (2005) assess the e↵ects of the Canadian Self Su ciency
Project using experimental data, again on employment outcomes. For the UK, Blundell and
Hoynes (2004), Brewer et al. (2006) and Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) assess the
employment e↵ects of the Working Families’ Tax Credit reform of 1999. Most studies find
significant and sizable employment e↵ects of in-work benefits.
In this paper we extend this work by acknowledging that in-work benefits may a↵ect life-cycle
careers through a number of mechanisms beyond the period-by-period changes in employment.
In particular, both the value of education and the costs of acquiring it may be a↵ected by the
presence of the subsidy; the in-work benefits will a↵ect the incentive to accumulate assets both
by providing an insurance mechanism and by reducing the needs for consumption smoothing;
the accumulation of human capital may change due to its dependence on part-time and full-
time work experience. We also recognize that dynamic links may be of great importance in
welfare evaluation: changes in behavior will thus take place both because of actual incentives
and in anticipation of future exposure. Finally, the insurance component of these schemes
may also be substantial. It may partially protect against adverse income shocks, possibly
encouraging individuals to remain in work for longer and boosting labour market attachment.
On the other hand such programs may crowd out individual savings reducing the capacity to
self-insure against shocks.
Specifically, we estimate a dynamic model of education choice, female labor supply, wages
and consumption over the life-cycle. At the start of their life-cycle, women decide the level of
education to be completed, taking into account the implied returns (which are a↵ected by taxes
and benefits). Once education is completed they make period-by-period employment decisions
depending on wages, their preferences and their family structure (married or single and whether
they have children). Importantly, wages are determined by education and experience, which
accumulates or depreciates depending on whether individuals work full-time, part-time or not
at all. While male income, fertility and marriage are exogenous, they are driven by stochastic
processes that depend on education and age. In this sense our results are conditional on the
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observed status quo process of family formation.
The model is estimated using data from 16 waves the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
covering the years 1991 to 2006 and uses a tax and benefit simulation model to construct
in some detail household budget constraints incorporating taxes and the welfare system and
the way it has changed over time.5 We find substantial labor supply elasticities: the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is 0.9 on the extensive (participation) margin and 0.45 on the intensive
one (part-time versus full-time). The elasticities are substantially higher for lower educated
single mothers, who are the main target group of the tax credit program. Relatively large
estimated income e↵ects lead to lower Marshallian elasticities. We also find that tax credit,
funded by increases in the basic rate of tax, have large employment e↵ects and do reduce college
education and increasing basic statutory schooling. Ignoring the adjustments to education that
could take place in the long run leads to an increase in the estimated e↵ects of the reforms.
Our results display large and significant returns to labour market experience especially for those
with higher levels of formal education. Those with basic education earn little or no returns
to experience. Interestingly, returns to experience are also found to be much stronger for full-
time employment. Part-time employment contributes very little to experience capital. This
di↵erential between full-time and part-time experience capital, as well as the di↵erent impact
of labour market experience across education groups, is found to be central in replicating the
distribution of female wages over the working life. These experience e↵ects are also shown to
be a key ingredient in understanding the responses of labour supply and human capital to tax
and welfare reform.
Other than income redistribution, benefits are designed for insurance purposes. Increases in the
generosity of benefits can increase social welfare (even without a preference for redistribution)
to the extent that the distortions to incentives are outweighed by the beneficial increase in
insurance in a world with incomplete markets. To assess the insurance properties of the
programs for di↵erent education groups we carry out two exercises. First we consider the
willingness to pay for decreases in labor market risk for the three education groups separately;
second we estimate the willingness to pay for equally costly increases in tax credits, income
support and tax cuts. We find that lower educated individuals are in fact willing to pay for
marginal increases in risk and middle education individuals are indi↵erent to increases in risk,
demonstrating that the downside is very well insured by the current programs. Higher educated
5The micro-simulator tool is called FORTAX; see Shephard, 2009 and Shaw, 2011, for details.
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individuals on the other hand are unwilling to accept more risk because these programs do
not insure them against the uncertainty they face. We also find that the welfare of the lowest
educated individuals increases most with small increases in the scope of tax credits, relative
to equally costly increases in income support; they have no taste for tax cuts. By contrast,
highest education individuals prefer tax cuts to equally costly increases in the generosity of
welfare programs. However from the perspective of a person before they make their education
choice, marginal increases in tax credits are preferred to equally costly tax cuts and the lowest
welfare gain is obtained by equivalent increases in the highly distortionary income support
program.
Amongst others, our paper builds on a long history of dynamic labor supply models: it is related
to Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) who developed the life-cycle model of female labor supply, to
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) who introduced a dynamic discrete choice model of labor supply,
wages and fertility, to Keane and Wolpin (1997) who estimate a dynamic model of education,
occupational choice and labor supply and to Shaw (1989), Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)
and Imai and Keane (2004) who consider lifecycle models of labor supply and consumption
with human capital accumulation. It also relates to the life-cycle consistent models of labor
supply and consumption developed by MaCurdy (1983), Altonji(1986), Blundell and Walker
(1986), Arellano and Meghir (1992), Blundell, Meghir and Neves (1993) and Blundell, Duncan
and Meghir (1998).
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. We begin the next section 2 with a
description of the key features of the model. Section 3 describes the data used for estimation
and the tax policy setting. Section 4 discusses the estimation procedures and results. We then
go on to investigate the overall model fit, the implications for wage and employment behavior
and the underlying elasticities in section 6. Section 7 We then turn to the use of the model for
policy evaluation by an application to the 1999 WFTC and Income Support reforms operating
in the UK; and finally section 8 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Model
We develop a life-cycle model of education choice, consumption and labor supply with on-the-
job human capital accumulation. Individuals are risk-averse and face productivity shocks with
a persistent stochastic structure. To account for the complex budget constraint our model
5
embeds a detailed micro-simulation model of the UK personal tax-benefit system. We allow
for changes in family composition over the life-cycle, including partnering, separation and
fertility. These occurrences may have great consequences for the cost of working, labor market
attachment and value of future work and therefore, in retrospect, educational investments.
However, we do not address the consequences of in-work benefits on family formation. These
are exogenously determined in our model.
Below, we first summarize the key features of the model, emphasizing the timing of events,
and then detail its specification.
2.1 The timing of events and decisions
We start tracking women’s decisions from the age of 16 with the choice of education.6 This
choice is the first step in defining a woman’s career, potentially a↵ecting future human capital
accumulation as well as changing her marriage market and the chance of being a single mother.7
Women choose between three alternatives: secondary (i.e. the compulsory level of education,
completed by age 16), high school (A-level or similar further education qualifications) and
University education depending on the balance of expected benefits and realized costs, which
include foregone earnings, direct financial costs representing fees and idiosyncratic (dis)taste
for education.
Upon leaving education, women enter the labour market. We model annual choices over labour
supply – with a discrete menu of unemployment, part-time and full-time employment – and
consumption. In parallel, family arrangements change according to processes of partnering
and childbearing, which are education-specific random processes estimated from the data, but
otherwise exogenous. To simplify the computations we assume working life ends deterministi-
cally at the age of 60, after which women are assumed to live for another 10 years when they
consume their accumulated savings. This is necessary to ensure a realistic accumulation of
assets throughout life, and to avoid relying excessively on labour supply as a way of smoothing
consumption.
6Some recent studies have added education decisions to the standard structural life-cycle model. Most have
focused on men, e.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997), Lee (2005) Adda et al. (2013) and Abbot et al. (2013). Studies
focussing on women include Adda et al. (2011).
7This is consistent with literature showing that the marriage market is responsible for substantial returns to
education van der Klaauw, 1996, Francesconi, 2002, Keane and Wolpin, 2010, Larsen et al., 2011, Chiappori,
Iyigun and Weiss (2012).
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Some of the features we introduce are especially important for our analysis. First, we specify
human capital accumulation as an ongoing process of acquisition and depreciation. This allows
us to capture the dynamic links in the earnings process of women, for whom career breaks and
short working hours are frequent and may have long lasting consequences. In our model, the
female rate of human capital accumulation depends on education choices made earlier in life,
on persistent heterogeneity that is related to preferences for working at the start of working
life, and on the level of human capital accumulated so far. Furthermore, working part-time
may a↵ect the accumulation of experience more than proportionally, and taking time out of the
labour market leads to human capital depreciating.8 Women’s earnings are then determined
by a combination of hours worked, their idiosyncratic level of human capital and the market
skill-specific wage rates.
Second, we include a consumption/savings decision.9 Ignoring savings would overstate the
role that labour supply plays in achieving consumption-smoothing, and would compromise the
model’s ability to reproduce labour supply profiles over the life-cycle. However, we do assume
that households are credit constrained: other than university loans, it is not possible to borrow
when net worth is negative.
Third, family circumstances are a major determinant of female labour supply and human
capital investment decisions. Their relation with labour supply has long been acknowledged
in the literature on structural female life-cycle models, but their consequences for education
investments has not been considered. We do not model marriage or fertility choices, but we
estimate the probabilities of marriage, separation and childbirth to reproduce the dynamics of
family formation observed in the data.10
Our focus is on modeling the life-cycle behavior of women abstracting from decisions such as
marital choice and fertility. Yet being single, marrying and having children are important fac-
tors a↵ecting choices, whether endogenous or not. Similarly to Browning and Meghir (1991),
our model is conditional on these other decisions; the main cost of this is that we take mar-
riage and fertility as unchanged in counterfactual simulations, and thus cannot work through
implications of changes in behavior in those dimensions. To capture the impact of marriage
8See also Huggett et al. (2011), who consider heterogeneity in wage profiles, and Adda et al. (2011), who
allow for a flexible specification of human capital accumulation by working hours.
9see also Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) and for men, French (2005), van der Klaauw and
Wolpin (2005).
10Studies that endogenize marriage and fertility decisions include van der Klaauw (1996), Francesconi (2002),
Keane and Wolpin (2010) and Adda et al. (2011).
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and fertility on preferences and on decisions as observed in the data, we characterize men by
a reduced form earnings and employment model depending on education level. Men earnings
are subject to persistent shocks, adding to the uncertainty faced by a woman. Single women
draw partners randomly with a probability that depends on her own characteristics, including
her education, thus replicating the sorting patterns in the data. Likewise, childbearing and
the probability of the couple separating also depend on female education. Thus this specifi-
cation recognizes that the marriage market, divorce, fertility and lone-motherhood are part of
the implications of education and accounted for when making choices, but are not allowed to
change in counterfactual simulations.
Finally, public transfers constitute the other source of household income, o↵ering minimum
income floors during periods of unemployment or low income, and potentially a↵ecting em-
ployment and education choices. We use FORTAX, a micro-simulation tax and benefit tool
to draw accurate budget constraints by family circumstances, thereby describing the financial
incentives to undertake work and invest in education.11
2.2 Working life
In each period of her adult life, which we take to be a year, a woman maximizes expected
lifetime utility taking as given her current characteristics and economic circumstances. These
are described by her age (t), education (s), accumulated assets (a), work experience (e), id-
iosyncratic productivity ( ) and the utility cost of working full time (✓FT ) or less (✓PT ). They
also include her family arrangements and related information: the presence of a partner (m),
his education (s˜), labour supply (l˜) and productivity ( ˜), the presence of children (k), age of
the youngest child (tk) and whether she has access to free childcare (dcc). We denote by Xt
the state space in period t, including these two sets of variables. In all that follows, lowercase
represents individual observed characteristics, the tilde denotes men’s variables, uppercase is
for market prices and sets of variables, and Greek letters are reserved for the model parameters
and unobserved shocks.
We assume that utility is intertemporally separable, and that instantaneous utility depends on
consumption per adult equivalent, female labour supply and preferences for work, and family
circumstances like marital status, partner’s employment and the presence and age of children.
11see Shephard, 2009 and Shaw, 2011, for details.
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Using the notation defined above, her instantaneous utility, which is non-separable between
consumption and leisure, is given by
u (ct, lt;Xt) =
(ct/nt)
µ
µ
exp
n
1(l 6= O)⇥ f
⇣
lt; st,mt, l˜t, kt, t
k
t , ✓
l
⌘o
(1)
where µ < 1, n is the equivalence scale,12 c is total family consumption, l is female labour
supply and assumes the three possible values: not-working (O), working part-time (PT) and
working full-time (FT); f reflects how the marginal utility of consumption changes with full-
time and part-time work, depending also on her education, family composition, whether the
male works or not and on unobserved costs of work. We specify
f = ✓l + ↵S ⇥ S + ↵F ⇥ F + ↵H ⇥H + ↵kkt + ↵mmt + ↵el1
⇣elt = FT⌘
+↵0 21
 
0 6 tkt 6 2
 
+ ↵3 51
 
3 6 tkt 6 5
 
+ ↵6 101
 
6 6 tkt 6 10
 
+ ↵11 181
 
11 6 tkt 6 18
 
where S, F and H are mutually exclusive dummies indicating secondary schooling, further
schooling and higher (college); tkt is the age of the youngest child. Although not shown explicitly
to economize in cumbersome notation, each of the ↵ parameters in f above depend on whether
the woman works full-time or part time: we specify ↵j = ↵j0 + ↵j1 ⇥ 1(l = PT ). Finally, ✓l is
a permanent individual specific random cost of work. It is drawn from a di↵erent distribution
depending on whether the woman works full-time or part-time. In practice it follows a two point
discrete distribution whose points of support and probability mass are estimated alongside the
remaining parameters.
As of age t0, given earlier education choices the woman’s problem can be written as:
Vt0 (Xt0) = max{ct,lt}t=t0,...t¯
Et0
(
t¯X
t=t0
 t t0u (ct, lt;Xt)
     Xt0
)
where Et0 is the expectation operator conditional on the available information at age t0 over
all future random events,   is the discount factor and V is the optimum value of discounted
present and future utility. t¯ is 10 years after retirement and the family lives o↵ its savings
during the retirement period.
12n=1 for singles, 1.6 for couples 1.4 for mother with child and 2 for a couple with children.
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Maximization has to respect a number of constraints, which we now describe.
The budget constraint which is described in terms of the asset evolution equation
at+1 = (1 + r)at + ltyt +mtl˜ty˜t   T (lt, Xt)  CC
⇣
tk, lt, l˜t
⌘
  ct (2)
at+1 > ws (3)
where r is the risk-free interest rate, (y, y˜) are the wage rates of wife and husband, T is the
net transfer to the public sector (taxes and welfare) and ws represents the borrowing limit;
this is either zero or the amount of the student loan borrowed (a negative number). CC are
childcare costs. Pre-school children need child care for as long as both adults are away from
home working; however school age children only need some childcare following the schooldays
as education is publicly provided. To capture these requirements we specify
CC
⇣
tk, lt,elt⌘ =
8>><>>:
ht ⇤ cch if tk 6 5 and
⇣elt = FT or mt = 0⌘
20 ⇤ cch if 5 6 tk 6 10 and lt = FT and
⇣elt = FT or mt = 0⌘
0 all other cases
where h is female working hours (0, 20 or 40 for O, PT and FT, respectively) and cch is
the constant per-hour rate, which we set to a number obtained from the data. Thus overall
child care costs only depend on the age of the youngest child and on male and female hours
and employment respectively. This structure economizes on computational requirements by
limiting the state space, while not giving up much on substance since, in practice, it is younger
children who are most demanding in terms of childcare. We assume that only some women
face positive childcare costs, in line with empirical information; others may have informal
arrangements in place. The probability that this happens is estimated within the model.
The tax and transfer function, T , unifies the tax and welfare system, describing the total
incentive structure faced by an individual at all income levels and turns out to be a complex
non-concave, non-smooth and often discontinuous function of income, hours of work and family
composition.13 The dependence on hours reflects the way the tax credit system in particular
is designed: for example eligibility requires a minimum of 16 hours.
13We use X to describe the set of variables on which T depends upon and only show the dependence on
female hours explicitly for notational simplicity.
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Families are credit constrained and, except for university graduates who have access to insti-
tutional loans during their university years, are not allowed to borrow.
Female human capital and earnings dynamics The female earnings process is education-
specific as determined by the following set of equations,
ln yt = lnYs +  s ln (et + 1) +  t + ⇠t (4)
et = et 1 (1   s) + gs (lt) (5)
 t = ⇢s t 1 + ⇣t (6)
where Ys is the market wage rate for women with education s. The stochastic idiosyncratic
productivity process,  , follows an AR(1) process with innovations, ⇣, and initial values drawn
from normal distributions. Experience, e, is accumulated while working, with returns measured
by parameters  s. This dynamic process for earnings distinguishes between endogenous state
dependence, through experience e↵ects, and heterogeneity in wage profiles, through persistent
productivity which is correlated with preferences for work at the start of working life. The
transitory wage shocks, represented by ⇠, are interpreted as measurement error and do not
influence choices. All unobserved components are education-specific random variables.
The process of experience accumulation is crucial for our analysis as it captures the potential
cost of career interruptions and of short working hours, thus determining the earnings profiles
of women. We allow for a concave profile of experience e↵ects, with  s estimated to be positive
but well below 1 for all s. The accumulation of experience happens on the job depending on
working hours, with learning by doing. Function gs (l) describes this process: it equals 1 unit
if the woman works full time and is estimated for part-time work (and is 0 for non-working
women). Moreover, experience depreciates, at an annual rate  s. Thus, the profile of wages
with respect to experience is concave for continuously employed women, with diminishing
increments as experience increases (as in Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989). We also allow for the
possibility that skills depreciate when women are working part-time, reflecting the possibly
lower learning content of part-time jobs. This e↵ect is driven by the relative size of  s and
gs (l) for part-time workers.
Male employment and earnings Male employment and earnings are exogenously set to
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follow a simple parametric, education-specific model. We assume men in couples either work
full-time (l˜ = 1) or are unemployed (l˜ = 0). We specify their employment process and wages
as follows:
Prob
h
l˜t = 1 |Xt
i
=
(
Prob
h
⌫˜t > h1
⇣
t, s˜t,elt 1⌘i if mt 1 = 1
Prob
⇥
⌫˜⇤t > h0 (t, s˜t)
⇤
if mt 1 = 0
(7)
ln y˜t = ln W˜s˜ +  ˜s˜ ln (t  18) + e t + e⇠t, t > 18 (8)
 ˜t = ⇢˜s˜ ˜t 1 + ⇣˜t (9)
where the earnings process is similar to that of women but instead of allowing for experience
we include a concave age profile.14 This simplifies the problem by reducing the state space
without much loss since men rarely have long spells of unemployment and tend not to work
part-time. However, we do allow for persistent shocks to earnings:  ˜t, is assumed to follow
an AR(1) process with normal innovations and normal initial values, all dependent on his
education, s˜. Transitory wage shocks (e⇠) are again interpreted as measurement error. The
dependence between the earnings and employment of spouses is captured by the correlation in
their education levels, as will be detailed below.
The stochastic process for male earnings is estimated separately before we estimate the main
model. We estimated two separate Heckman (1979) selection models of male earnings: one
in first di↵erences for males who were present in two consecutive periods; the other for newly
formed couples. We used a number of alternative employment selection equations with dif-
ferent combinations of instruments for selection including, in addition to age, education and
past employment, family demographics potential benefits in the non-work state, and di↵erent
measures of assets or of their income. In estimation we find no evidence of selection and thus
assume ⇣˜t, ⌫˜t and ⌫˜⇤t are mutually independent normal random variables. The male innovations
follow a random walk.
14In order to avoid including both male and female age in the state space and so as to allow for the fact
that female and male age are highly correlated in practice, we include female age in the male earnings equation
instead of male age. This simplifies the computations, while allowing age e↵ects on male earnings, which is
important in a lifecycle model.
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The dynamics of family composition Family dynamics are stochastic but exogenously
set to reproduce the patterns observed in the data by female education. If a child is present
then k = 1 and tk is her age. In the model only the age of the youngest child matters for
preferences and costs. Hence, when a new child arrives we just reinitialize tk to zero. The
probability that a new child arrives depends on the age and education of the woman, whether
she has other children and the age of the youngest, and whether she is married. It is given by
Prob
⇥
tk = 0
  t, s, kt 1, tkt 1,mt 1 ⇤ . (10)
Once a child is born, she/he will live with the mother until completing 19 years of age.
Similarly, the probability of being married to a man with education s˜ depends on the woman’s
age and education, whether she was married in the previous period – in which case it is assumed
she remains in the same couple – and on the presence of children. It is given by
Prob [s˜t |t, s,mt 1, s˜t 1, kt 1 ] . (11)
Thus the model allows both for couple formation and for dissolution, all probabilities depending
on a rich set of demographic circumstances.
2.3 Educational choice
The individual chooses education based on expected returns and realized costs at the start
of active life in the model (aged 17). The choice depends on the information available at the
time, which includes her initial level of assets, permanent preferences for leisure (correlated
with initial productivity), utility costs of education and access to free childcare, as well as
all institutional features and prices, including fees and possible loans. We denote by X17 the
woman’s information set at 17.
We assume that, whatever the education choice, entry to the labor market does not take
place before age 19; between the age of 17 and 18 parents are assumed to provide for their
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children.15 The opportunity cost of education for this group will be captured by the estimated
non-pecuniary costs of education. When entry in the labor market becomes an option, at age
19, we assume that education and labor supply are mutually exclusive activities. Entrance in
the labor market is at age 19 for both secondary school (s = 1) and high school graduates
(s = 2), and at age 22 for university graduates (s = 3). University students need to fund their
consumption needs and education costs out of their assets and institutional student loans. The
optimal choice of education is defined by
s = argmax
s2{1,2,3}
{Vs (X17) +$s}
where $s is the utility cost of education s, assumed iid, and Vs is the discounted value of
lifetime utility if the woman chooses education level s. It is given by
Vs (X17) =
8<: E [V19 (X19) |X17, s ] if s = 1, 2E  max
c19...c21
 P21
t=19  
t 19u (ct, lt = FT ;X17) +  22 19V22 (X22)
     X17, s  if s = 3
where it is assumed that university years carry a utility cost similar to that of full-time work,
in excess of the education specific preferences described by $s. Optimization is subject to the
budget constraint, which includes assets at the start of working life observed in the data16
a19 = (1 + r)
2a17
a22 = (1 + r)
3a19   (1 + r)2c19   (1 + r)c20   c21   F if s = 3
with F being the university fee for a three year degree. Any assets at age 17 are measured from
the BHPS data and are presumably the result of parental and other transfers. We also assume
implicitly that any costs of education are either financed by student loans or by parents, and
are captured but the estimated costs of education. University students are allowed to borrow
in the open market up to £5000, which can cover tuition costs of £3000 and some living
expenses.
15Individuals choosing to acquire professional education, including that providing on-the-job training, are
classified as students between ages 17 and 18. It is being assumed that individuals 18 and younger have loose
labor market attachments, not conducive of experience accumulation.
16Initial assets are typically small or zero. We observe money in savings accounts, other assets and liabilities
3 times during the observation period. In these years we compute net wealth for those aged 17-18 and set to
zero any negative values.
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3 Data and Tax Policy Setting
3.1 The Panel Data Sample
In estimation we make use of the first 16 waves (1991 to 2006) of the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS). In this panel, apart from those who are lost through attrition, all
families in the original 1991 sample and subsequent booster samples remain in the panel from
then onwards. Other individuals have been added to the sample in subsequent periods —
sometimes temporarily — as they formed families with original interviewees or were born
into them. All members of the household aged 16 and above are interviewed, with a large
set of information being collected on demographic characteristics, educational achievement,
employment and hours worked, income and benefits, and some expenditures, particularly those
relating to childcare. Information on assets is collected only every 5 years.
We follow women over the observation period, so the sample represents British families with one
or two working-age adults other than single men. Families where the female is self-employed
have also been dropped to avoid the di culties relating to measuring their hours.17 Our full
data set is an unbalanced panel of women aged between 19 and 50 and observed over at least
two consecutive periods during the years 1991 to 2006. 10% of these women are observed
over the whole period, 60% in no more than 6 consecutive waves, 24% are observed entering
working life from education. Some key sample descriptive statistics by education and family
composition are presented in Table 2. Further details are provided in Appendix A.
Our model does not deal with macroeconomic growth and fluctuations; we thus remove aggre-
gate wage growth from all monetary values. The monetary parameters in the tax and welfare
system (such as tax thresholds and eligibility levels) were similarly adjusted. In addition we
remove cohort e↵ects to avoid confounding the true life-cycle profiles with di↵erences across
generations. Individuals with wages in the top and bottom 2% of the distribution were dropped
entirely.18
17The entire histories of 2.9% of women were dropped and partial histories (from the moment they move to
self employment) were dropped for another 3.1% of women
18The censoring of the distribution from below is at £1.8 per hour in 2006 prices, well below the minimum
wage.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics - family demographics in 2002
Mothers Childless Number of
singles in couples women observations
women aged 19-50 0.137 0.439 0.424 2073
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
women aged 30-45 0.165 0.582 0.253 1151
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
Women aged 30-45, by education
secondary 0.213 0.571 0.216 610
(0.017) (0.020) (0.017)
further 0.144 0.612 0.244 353
(0.019) (0.026) (0.023)
higher 0.048 0.564 0.388 188
(0.016) (0.036) (0.036)
Notes: Based on BHPS data for 2002. Standard errors in parenthesis under estimates.
3.2 The UK Tax Policy Setting
The UK personal tax and transfer system comprises a small number of simple taxes (mostly
levied at the individual level), and a complex web of welfare benefits and tax credits (usually
means-tested at the family level). Our simulations in section 7 focus on reforms between April
1999 and April 2002 whose key elements we now describe.19
Reforms between April 1999 and April 2002 primarily a↵ected Income Support (IS), Family
Credit (FC) and Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC). Income Support (IS) is a benefit for
families working less than 16 hours a week that tops family income up to a level that depends
on family circumstances such as the number and age of children. Between April 1999 and April
2002, there was a big increase in the generosity of these child additions for younger children,
coinciding with the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) reform (see below). Since IS is an
income top-up, it implicitly creates a 100% marginal tax rate.
Family credit (FC) existed as part of the April 1999 system and provided means-tested support
for working families with children. To be eligible, families had to have at least one adult working
19For a more comprehensive discussion of UK taxes and transfers, see Browne and Roantree (2012) and
Browne and Hood (2012). All taxes and transfers are modeled using the FORTAX microsimulation library
using FORTAX; see Shephard (2009) and Shaw (2011) for more details.
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16 or more hours a week and have at least one dependent child. The maximum credit depended
on family circumstances and hours of work. Above a threshold, FC was tapered away at a
rate of 70%. There was a generous childcare disregard acting to reduce net income before the
taper calculation.
By April 2002, FC had been replaced by WFTC. WFTC was e↵ectively the same benefit
as FC, just much more generous. This was for three main reasons: maximum awards were
higher, the means-testing threshold was higher (rising in real terms by 10%) and awards were
tapered away more slowly (55% rather than 70%). The increase in maximum awards was
particularly large. For example, for a lone parent working 20 hours at the minimum wage
with one child aged 4 and no childcare expenditure, the maximum rose by 25% in real terms.
The main structural di↵erence between FC and WFTC was the treatment of childcare. The
FC childcare disregard was replaced by a childcare credit worth 70% of childcare expenditure
up to a limit of £130 per week. This meant that the maximum award rose enormously for
parents spending considerable amounts on childcare. The combined e↵ect of these changes was
to increase substantially awards for existing claimants and extend entitlement to new (richer)
families
Figure 1 compares the overall generosity of the two systems for a lone parent family with one
child aged 4 with no childcare expenditure. The increase in net income is not as big as the
increase in maximum tax credit awards described above because tax credits count as income
in the calculation for some other benefits. Figure 2 provides the corresponding transfers and
budget constraints for a woman with same characteristics but with a partner working full time
(if the partner does not work, the budget constraint is similar to that in Figure 1).
Previous studies have highlighted the heterogeneous nature of the impact of these reforms,
depending in particular on family circumstances and interactions with other taxes and benefits
(Brewer, Saez and Shephard, 2010). One particularly important example is Housing Benefit
(HB), a large means-tested rental subsidy program potentially a↵ecting the same families as
are eligible to tax credits. HB covers up to 100% of rental costs for low-income families, but the
withdrawal rate is high (65% on net income). Families eligible for HB face strong disincentives
to work that the WFTC reform does not resolve.
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Figure 1: IS/tax credit award and budget constraint for low-wage lone parent
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Lone parent earns the minimum wage (£5.05) and has one child aged 4 and no expenditure
on childcare or rent. Tax system parameters uprated to April 2006 earnings levels.
Figure 2: IS/tax credit award for low-wage parent with low-wage partner working full time
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Parents earn the minimum wage (£5.05) and have one child aged 4 and no expenditure on
childcare or rent. Partner works 40 hours per week. Tax system parameters uprated to April
2006 earnings levels. IS reform absent from figure because family not entitled to IS.
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4 Estimation
We follow a two-step procedure to recover the parameters of the model. In a first step we
estimate the equations for the exogenous elements of the model, including the dynamics of
marriage, divorce, fertility, male labour supply, male earnings and the cost of childcare. Details
and estimates can be found in appendix B. In addition, two parameters are fixed based on
pre-existing estimates: the coe cient µ is set to -0.56 giving a risk aversion coe cient of 1.56,
consistent with evidence in Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1993) and Attanasio and Weber
(1995); the discount factor   is set to 0.98 as for example in Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos
(2008). The risk-free interest rate is set to 0.015, which is slightly lower than the discount rate
thus implying that agents have some degree of impatience; tuition cost of university education
is fixed to £3,000 for the three years program and the credit limit for university students (and
graduates throughout their life) is £5,000, both reflecting the university education policy of
the late nineties in the UK. No further credit is allowed.
There are a total of 54 remaining parameters, including those determining initial female earn-
ings, their stochastic wage process and their accumulation of experience, the distribution of
preferences for working and how it varies by family circumstances, the distribution of pref-
erences for education and the probability of facing positive childcare costs if having a child.
These are estimated using the method simulated of moments in the second step (appendix C
provides some detail on computational issues).20
Specifically, the estimation procedure is implemented as an iterative process in four steps. The
first step involves solving the female life-cycle problem given a set of parameter values. We
then simulate the life-cycle choices of 22,780 women in step 2, using the observed distribution
of initial assets, and select an observation window for each so that the overall simulated sample
reproduces the time and age structure of the observed data.21 The simulations assume women
face to up to three policy regimes over the observation window, representing the main tax and
benefits systems operating during the 90s and early 00s (we adopted the 1995, the 2000 and
the 2004 regimes and assumed they operated over the periods prior to 1998, 1998 to 2002 and
2003 onwards, respectively). This implies that the tax system is allowed to induce variability in
behavior di↵erently for each cohort. Individuals are assumed to have static expectations of the
20Original references are Lerman and Manski (1981), McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989). See
also Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993a and 1993b) or Gallant and Tauchen (1996).
21this is described in section 6.1
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tax system and thus all reforms arrive unexpectedly. In step 3 we compute the moments using
the simulated dataset, equivalent to those we computed from the observed data. Through this
iterative process the estimated parameters ⇥ˆ solve the minimization problem
⇥ˆ = argmin⇥{⌃Kk=1[(Mdkn  Mmks(⇥))2/V ar(MdkN)]}
where the sum is over the K moments, Mdkn denotes the kth data moment estimated over n
observations, Mms (⇥) represents the kth simulated moment evaluated at parameter value ⇥
over s simulations. Note that we do not use the asymptotically optimal weight matrix because
of its potentially poor small sample properties.22
The simulation procedure controls for any initial conditions problem by starting the simulation
at the start of life. Unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for in the construction of the simulated
moments. We match in total 191 data moments. The moments we match are:23
• The average employment rate by family circumstances and female education;
• The average rate of part-time work by family circumstances and female education;
• Transition rates between employment and unemployment by presence of male, female
education and past female wage;
• Estimates from female wage equations in first di↵erences by education, including the
correlation with experience, the autocorrelation of the residual and the variance in inno-
vations;
• Average, variance and various percentiles of the distribution of log wage rates by educa-
tion and working hours;
• Average, variance and various percentiles of the distribution of initial log wage rates by
education;
• The average yearly change in wage rate by past working status and education;
22see Altonji and Segal (1996) on the small sample issue of weighted minimum distance estimators.
23The simulation reproduces any selection process in the data we observe.
20
• The distribution of education attainment;
• The probability of positive childcare costs among working women by education.
A full list of observed and simulated moments demonstrating the fit of the model can be found
in Appendix D.
We compute asymptotic standard errors following Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993).
This corrects for the e↵ects of simulation noise.
5 Results
5.1 Parameter estimates
Table 2 reports the estimates for the wage process. Both the initial level and the returns
to experience increase with education. Even controlling for experience, we still find strong
persistence in wage shocks although not quite a unit root in this data. Productivity at entry
in the labour market is found to be significantly (negatively) related with preferences for
leisure.
Experience increases by one for each year of full-time work. However, experience gained while
working part-time is a small fraction of this, in between 0.1 and 0.15 (row 7). Moreover,
experience depreciates continuously at a rate shown in row 8, of about 11%. This is a high value
as compared with others in the literature (for instance, Attanasio, Low and Sanchez Marcos
find a depreciation rate for women of 7.4% using PSID data for the US). When combined with
the accumulation of human capital while working part-time, these depreciation rates imply
that workers may su↵er losses in experience when working just part-time: while being out-of-
work leads to skill depreciation, part-time work may at best just maintain the level of skills and
only full-time work enhances them. We will return to this below as the part-time experience
penalty turns out to be a key component of the empirical model for women in our sample.
In Table 3 we show the estimates of the parameters of the utility cost of working. The function f
in the current period utility function (1) is simply a set of shifters in the utility of consumption
for di↵erent family circumstances and education levels interacted with working hours. The
parameters are incremental both over rows and columns in the table; for instance, a type I
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Table 2: Estimates of the female wage equation and experience accumulation parameters
Education attainment
secondary further higher
(1) (2) (3)
(1) hourly wage rate (0 experience): Ys 4.49 4.88 6.29
(0.018) (0.022) (0.034)
(2) returns experience:  s 0.14 0.23 0.28
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
(3) autocorrelation coe cient: ⇢s 0.92 0.95 0.89
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
(4) st. error innovation in productivity:
p
Var (⇣s) 0.13 0.13 0.12
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
(5) mean initial productivity for type I: E (⌫0s|type I) 0.10 0.10 0.20
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
(6) st. error initial productivity:
p
Var (⌫0s) 0.30 0.26 0.26
(0.013) (0.015) (0.025)
(7) human capital accumulation while in PT work: gs(l = PT ) 0.15 0.12 0.10
(0.027) (0.027) (0.022)
(8) human capital depreciation rate:  s 0.12 0.11 0.11
(0.016) (0.011) (0.008)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis under estimates. Type I women (row 5) are those with lower prefer-
ences for leisure. “PT” stands for part-time work.
woman, mother of a two-year old with secondary education and working full time will have
an argument in the exponential function of 0.41+0.05+0.15-0.08, corresponding to the sum of
parameters in column 1, rows 1, 4, 5, and 11. If she is working part-time, the argument will
be (0.41 + 0.05 + 0.15   0.08) + ( 0.15   0.06   0.05   0.16) where the first term equals the
factor for full time workers and the second is the increment for part-time. Positive and larger
values of the argument in the exponential function make working less attractive.
The argument in the exponential factor of the instantaneous utility is positive for all combi-
nations of family circumstances, education attainment and working hours. So labor market
participation always reduces the value of consumption (and increases its marginal value). The
reduction is more pronounced for mothers of young children and less so for women in cou-
ples with working partners. The reductions are also less marked for part-time work, showing
women have a comparative preference for lower working hours. Type I women are those with
a relatively high preference for working; the factor for type II women is such that they average
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Table 3: Estimates of preference parameters - function f in equation 1
all employment part-time employment
value st. error value st. error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Secondary education 0.41 (0.010) -0.15 (0.023)
(2) Further education 0.41 (0.010) -0.16 (0.024)
(3) Higher education 0.47 (0.007) -0.20 (0.024)
(4) Mother 0.05 (0.015) -0.06 (0.026)
(5) Mother of child aged 0-2 0.15 (0.013) -0.05 (0.011)
(6) Mother of child aged 3-5 0.07 (0.013) -0.06 (0.012)
(7) Mother of child aged 6-10 -0.02 (0.013) 0.03 (0.012)
(8) Mother of child aged 11-18 -0.07 (0.010) 0.06 (0.009)
(9) Woman in couple -0.06 (0.021) -0.02 (0.029)
(10) Woman in couple, partner working -0.17 (0.020) 0.09 (0.019)
(11) Type I: utility cost of work: ✓(l) -0.08 (0.004) -0.16 (0.005)
(12) Type I: probability 0.51 (0.004)
Notes: The coe cients in rows 1 to 11 are shifters in the utility of consumption by family characteristics, education
and working hours. Column 1 reports values for working women and column 3 reports the increment for working
part-time. Row 12 reports the probability of being a type I woman, where type I women have relatively high
preference for working. Columns 2 and 4 display the asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis.
to zero over the population of adult women.
Estimates for the utility cost parameters for education and childcare are displayed in Table 4.
Rows 1 to 4 show estimates for the mean and scale parameter of the distribution of prefer-
ences for high school and university education, assumed to follow extreme value distributions
(the scale parameters determine the variance of the distribution). Explaining the observed
proportion of women with university education given its costs and expected returns requires
women to have, on average, some positive preference for it. This is in contrast to preferences
for high-school education, which are more dispersed with a negative, but smaller in absolute
value, mean.24
Mothers may face positive childcare costs if all adults in the household are working, in which
case the cost of childcare is £2.09 per working hour for children under the age of 5 or per
working hour in excess of 20 hours per week for children aged 5 to 10. The probability that
24This result is in part driven by the simplifying assumption that high school education has no direct or
opportunity costs
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Table 4: Education and child-care utility cost parameters
value st. error
(1) (2)
(1) Utility cost of further education: mean (E (!s=2)) -0.28 (0.024)
(2) Utility cost of further education: scale (
p
Var (!s=2)) 1.91 (0.060)
(3) Utility cost of higher education: mean (E (!s=3)) 0.47 (0.022)
(4) Utility cost of higher education: scale (
p
Var (!s=3)) 0.99 (0.018)
(5) Probability of positive childcare costs 0.43 (0.015)
Notes: The coe cients in rows 1 to 4 determine the distribution of preferences for high
school and university education, assumed to follow extreme value distributions. Column
2 displays the asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis.
this happens is estimated to be slightly below 50% (row 5).
Family transition probabilities were estimated using linear probability regressions of an ar-
rival/departure dummy on an order 2 polynomial in female age and, in the case of child
arrival, an order 2 polynomial in age of any older child and a linear interaction. Regressions
were run separately for a number of di↵erent cases. For the arrival of a partner, one regression
was run for each of the nine combinations of female and partner education level; for the de-
parture of a partner, we run regressions by female education level; for child arrival, regressions
were run by female education level and couple status. These specifications were chosen to be
parsimonious while fitting patterns in the data well. Various age restrictions were imposed
(e.g. child arrival was estimated only for women aged 42 or less) all regressions were weighted
to ensure an equal number of women at each age. The resulting predicted probabilities were
modified to be non-increasing or zero above a certain age and zero if negative. More details
are provided in Appendix B.
6 Implications for Behavior
6.1 Model Simulations
To assess the properties of the model we first examine its ability to reproduce the basic fea-
tures of earnings and employment observed in our sample by comparing model simulations to
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observed data. The comparisons are based on a simulated dataset of 22,780 women, 5 times
the size of the BHPS sample. We use the observed distribution of individual assets at the
ages of 17 to 18 to initialize simulations. Assets are observed in the BHPS in three points in
time, in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 waves; there are 562 observations of assets for 17-18 years
old, from which initial conditions are drawn for each individual simulation. The initial values
for unobserved preferences for work and education are drawn randomly from their estimated
distributions. Based on this information, education decisions are simulated. Then, the un-
observed productivity process is initialized, drawing from its estimated distribution, which is
conditional on education and unobserved heterogeneity in work preferences. Finally, the full
working life profiles are simulated for each individual, driven by the stochastic process for
productivity.
The simulations underlying the results discussed in this section are based on changing tax
and benefits systems that reproduce the reforms implemented during the observation period,
between 1991 and 2006. We assume that yearly reforms arrive unexpectedly from 1992 onwards;
the 1991 tax and benefits system is extended to all earlier years. Thus, the choices of women
older than 17 in 1991 are simulated up to that point under the 1991 tax and benefits system.
For each of the simulated life-cycle profiles we then only keep an observation window chosen
to ensure that the simulated dataset reproduces the time and age structure of the observed
BHPS sample.
6.2 Wages and Employment
The life-cycle profiles of wage rates for working women are presented in Figure 3 for each
education group. These fit the observed profiles reasonably well and show the lowest education
group having the most flat profile becoming steeper for higher education groups. Figure 4
shows that this pattern is replicated across the percentiles of the life-cycle wage distribution
and demonstrates that the model can reproduce the dispersion of wages.
A key feature of the wage profiles is that they become rapidly quite flat. The flattening out in
the profiles represents two opposing e↵ects. The first being the impact of cumulative experience
which leads to a continuous rise in the profile. The second being the increasing occurrence of
part-time work which o↵-sets the growth through the part-time experience penalty. This is
clearly shown in Figure 5 which displays the expected profile of the part-time penalty in wage
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Figure 3: Mean log wage rates for working women over the life-cycle by education: data versus
model
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Notes: BHPS versus simulated data. 2005 prices.
Figure 4: Distribution of log wage rates for working women over the life-cycle by education:
data versus model
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Notes: BHPS versus simulated data. 2005 prices. All curves smoothed using kernel weights
and a bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 5: Experience gap for women in part-time work from the age of 30; by education
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Notes: All values in wage units. Curves represent di↵erence in accumulated experience
between women taking part-time work from the age of 31 onwards as compared to taking
full-time work over the same period, all conditional on full-time employment up to the age
of 30.
units for women who work full-time until they are aged 30 then move in to part-time work.
The severity of the penalty increases with education.
The life-cycle profile of employment rates are displayed in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 6 confirms
the well known fact that employment rates increase with education. It also reveals that em-
ployment profiles are U-shaped irrespective of education, although the dip occurs earlier and is
more pronounced for lower levels of education. This profile reflects the impact of child bearing
on labour supply, especially during the child’s early years, and the lower labour market attach-
ment among lower-educated women. There are several features of the model that explain the
higher labour market attachment of more educated women (in addition to higher wage rates).
These include higher returns to experience, higher human capital depreciation rates, and a
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity leading to a disproportionately high representation
of high-productivity individuals among more educated women. These factors create simulated
profiles that closely resemble those from data.
The e↵ects of family composition are displayed in Figure 7. Here we show the overall em-
ployment rates and the part-time employment rates as they evolve before and after childbirth.
Again these replicate closely the patterns in the data across education groups. A full set of
27
Figure 6: Female employment rates over the life-cycle: data versus model
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Notes: BHPS versus simulated data.
model comparisons with the data moments used in estimation is presented in Appendix D.
As a final validation exercise in Table 5 we emulate the di↵erences-in-di↵erences estimator
for the full set of reforms implemented in late 1999. Given the nature of the exercise, where
we are looking at immediate short-run e↵ects, we do not allow education choices to respond.
This estimator compares the employment of single mothers (the treatment group) to similar
single women without children. The simulation in Table 5 produces an estimated di↵erence
in di↵erences parameter of 3.9 percentage points increase in employment resulting from the
reforms relative to the employment of single women without children. In row 3 we present
the closest published (matching) di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimator which uses the Labor Force
Data (LFS) producing an estimate of 3.6 percentage points, which is very close to our model
simulations.25
6.3 Elasticities of labour supply
Simulated wage elasticities of labour supply are presented in Table 6. Marshallian elasticities
25see Eissa and Liebman (1996) for similar di↵erences-in-di↵erences estimates of the US Earned Income Tax
Credit in the US.
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Figure 7: Female employment rates by years to/from childbirth
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Notes: BHPS versus simulated data. All curves smoothed using kernel weights and a band-
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Table 5: The impact of the reforms on the employment rates of lone mothers with secondary
education - model simulations versus data estimates
e↵ect st. error
(1) model simulation 3.9 -
(2) authors’ estimate on LFS data 4.2 1.4
(3) Blundell, Brewer and Shephard (2005) 3.6 0.5
(4) Brewer, Duncan, Shephard and Suarez (2006, simulation) 3.7
Notes: Row 1 displays the result from DID calculations of the impact of the welfare reforms implemented
between 1999 and 2002 using simulated data and comparing 1999 (pre-reform) with 2002 (post-reform)
employment status of lone mothers and childless single women. The reforms are assumed to be unannounced.
Row 2 shows similar calculations based on data from the Labour Force Survey after matching on age. Rows
3 and 4 display similar results from the existing literature.
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Figure 8: Marshallian elasticities over the life-cycle of women: permanent expected shift in
net earnings
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Notes: Based on simulated data using the 1999 tax and benefit system.
are obtained by perturbing the entire profile of wages and comparing the outcome of the sim-
ulation across the original and new profile. The Frisch elasticities are obtained by perturbing
wages at one age at a time and computing the e↵ect at each age separately. Since the per-
turbation in the latter case is very small there are no wealth e↵ects; this together with the
anticipated nature of the perturbation allows us to interpret this as a wealth constant or Frisch
elasticity.
As theory implies, Frisch elasticities are always higher than Marshallian ones, which allow
for wealth e↵ects. Participation is more elastic than hours, a result that is common in the
empirical literature.26. Mothers are more responsive to changes in net wages than women with
no children, another typical result in the empirical literature.27. The labour supply of younger
women is more elastic than that of older ones, a consequence not only of changes in family
composition over the life-cycle, but also of the higher returns to work at younger ages due to
human capital accumulation (see Imai and Keane, 2004). Finally, less educated women are
also much more responsive to incentives, particularly on the intensive margin.
26see the survey of participation and hours elasticities in Meghir and Phillips (2010)
27see Blundell, Meghir and Neves, 1993, or Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998
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Table 6: Wage elasticities of labour supply and derivatives - extensive (participation) and
intensive (full-time work conditional on participation)
Frisch Marshall
extensive intensive extensive intensive
elast. deriv. elasticity elast. deriv. elasticity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) all 0.90 0.71 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.38
By education
(2) secondary education 1.97 1.27 0.88 0.93 0.60 0.63
(3) further education 0.68 0.56 0.40 0.46 0.38 0.37
(4) higher education 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.18
By family composition
(5) Lone mothers 4.23 2.40 0.97 1.93 1.09 0.78
(6) Mothers in couples 0.70 0.52 0.62 0.51 0.38 0.50
(7) Women without children 0.52 0.49 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.20
Notes: All values based on simulated data under the 1999 tax and benefits system. The elasticities in columns 1 and
4 measure the percentual change in labour supply in response to a 1% increase in net earnings. They di↵er from the
derivatives in columns 2 and 5, which measure the percentage change in labour supply in response to a 1% increase in
net earnings. The elasticities in columns 3 and 6 measure the percentual change in full-time work rates among employed
women in response to a 1% increase in net earnings. The values in columns 1 to 3 are responses to expected changes in
net earnings lasting for one single year, randomly selected for each woman. The values in columns 4 to 6 are responses
to unexpected changes in net earnings occurring at a randomly selected year for each woman and lasting for the rest of
her working life. The e↵ects are measured in the year of the change in earnings.
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Figure 9: Life-cycle income e↵ects
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Notes: Based on simulated data using the 1999 tax and benefit system.
The response elasticities also vary in systematic ways with age, education and family composi-
tion. This is clearly shown in figures 8 for the Marshallian elasticities at the extensive margin
and life-cycle income e↵ects, also at the extensive margin, in Figure 9.
7 Assessing the Impact of Tax Policy Reform
7.1 Incentive e↵ects of the Tax Credit and Income support reforms
In this section we simulate the short and longer-run impact the 1999 Working Families Tax
Credit (WFTC) and Income Support (IS) reforms described earlier.28 We compare the choices
of women facing the baseline 1999 tax and benefits system, prior to the WFTC and IS reforms,
with alternative hypothetical systems which include some features of the 1999 WFTC and IS
reforms.
Table 7 shows the simulated impact of the reforms on single mothers and on mothers in married
couples separately. These are revenue neutral reforms where neutrality is achieved by adjusting
28The analysis is based on the simulation of 22,780 life-cycle profiles.
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Table 7: Simulated e↵ects of revenue neutral reforms on the employment rate of mothers (ppt)
Single mothers Mothers in couples
by baseline educ by baseline educ
sec furth high all sec furth high all
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-reform education choice
(1) WFTC and child IS 3.8 3.5 1.5 2.9 -6.0 -4.4 -1.7 -4.0
(2) WFTC 12.4 12.0 7.3 10.6 -5.2 -3.5 -1.3 -3.3
(3) WFTC and child IS w/ 70% withdrawal 2.1 1.4 -0.6 0.9 -2.7 -2.2 -0.7 -1.9
Post-reform education choice
(4) WFTC and child IS 3.8 3.0 -3.6 1.0 -6.1 -4.7 -3.2 -4.7
(5) WFTC 12.4 11.8 4.0 9.4 -5.3 -3.7 -2.2 -3.7
(6) WFTC and child IS w/ 70% withdrawal 2.1 0.9 -4.6 -0.4 -2.8 -2.4 -1.8 -2.3
Notes: Based on simulated data. All reforms are revenue neutral, with adjustments in the basic tax rate making up for di↵erences
in the public budget relative to baseline (1999). E↵ects from comparisons with baseline tax and benefit system. Rows 1 and 4
show the e↵ects of a joint reform of in-work and out-of-work benefits: (i) the family credit as in 1999 is replaced by the WFTC as
it 2002 and (ii) the child component of IS as in 1999 is replace by the more generous level adopted in 2002. Rows 2 and 5 single
out the e↵ect of replacing replacing FC as in 1999 by WFTC as in 2002. Rows 3 and 6 impose the 1999 withdrawal rate (70%) on
the joint reform in rows 1 and 4. Rows 1 to 3 display the e↵ects if education is kept at pre-reform levels. Rows 4 to 6 allow for
education choices to adjust to the new incentives. Columns 1 to 4 show e↵ects for single mothers by education. Columns 5 to 8
show e↵ects for mothers in couples. The three levels of education are secondary (‘sec’, columns 1 and 5), further (‘furth’, columns
2 and 6) and college or university (‘high’, columns 3 and 7).
the basic rate of income tax to maintain exchequer revenue. Table 8 shows the changes in the
basic tax rate required to maintain revenue neutrality.
The first panel of results in rows 1 to 3 of Table 7 show the simulated impacts holding education
choices as given; in the second panel, rows 4 to 6, education is allowed to respond. The first
reform we consider simulates the impact of all WFTC and the changes in the child elements
of IS. For single mothers, the largest impact is for those with basic school qualifications.
Employment rises by 3.8 percentage points. The impact for those completing secondary school
is a little lower and, as expected, much lower for those with university level education. As
we saw from the budget constraint figures earlier, this reform reduces incentives to work for
women in couples where the partner works. As a results there is a large fall in employment for
them.
We contrast these results to those of two simpler reforms. The first just introduces the WFTC.
The second introduces the WFTC and the IS reforms but retains the 70% withdrawal rate
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Table 8: Basic tax rates that maintain revenue at baseline level (%)
Education choice
Pre-reform Post-reform
(1) baseline (1999 tax and benefit system) 23.0 23.0
(2) WFTC and child IS 24.7 25.6
(3) WFTC 24.0 24.6
(4) WFTC and child IS with 70% withdrawal rate 24.3 24.9
Notes: Based on simulated data. Basic tax rate required to keep public budget at the same level as baseline
(1999). Row 1 shows the basic tax rate for the baseline system (1999). Row 2 adds WFTC and the child
component of IS as in 2002. Row 3 elliminates the reform in the child component of IS. Row 4 imposes the
1999 withdrawal rate (70%) on the joint reform in row 2. Column 1 displays results if education is kept at
pre-reform levels. Column 2 allows for education choices to adjust to the new incentives.
Table 9: Education among women - simulated distribution by policy regime; revenue neutral
reforms
Education
secondary further higher
(1) baseline (1999 tax and benefit system) 30.4 47.5 22.1
(2) WFTC and child IS 32.3 47.1 20.6
(3) WFTC 31.7 47.3 21.0
(4) WFTC and child IS with 70% withdrawal rate 31.8 47.2 21.0
Notes: Based on simulated data. All reforms are revenue neutral, with adjustments in the basic tax rate making up for
di↵erences in the public budget relative to baseline (1999). Row 1 shows results for the baseline 1999 tax and benefit
system. Row 2 adds WFTC and the child component of IS as in 2002. Row 3 removes the reform in the child component
of IS. Row 4 imposes the 1999 withdrawal rate (70%) on the joint reform in row 2.
that existed under family credit (FC) rather than moving to the lower 55% withdrawal rate
of WFTC. The positive employment impacts for single mothers are considerably enhanced in
the former whereas they are scaled back in the later.
The impact of allowing education to change is shown in rows 3 to 6 of Table 7. The results
are tabulated on the basis of pre-reform educational choice. Those with the minimum level of
education have no incentive to increase it and of course cannot decrease it further; so for them
there is no di↵erence to the earlier results. For the other two education groups employment
e↵ects are reduced when education choices are allowed to adjust. Turning to Table 9 we see
that this is accompanied by a shift towards lower education levels.
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Table 10: Simulated e↵ects of non-revenue neutral reforms on employment rates of mothers
(ppt)
Single mothers Mothers in couples
by baseline educ by baseline educ
sec furth high all sec furth high all
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-reform education choice
(1) WFTC and child IS 3.8 3.6 1.6 3.0 -5.9 -4.3 -1.7 -4.0
(2) WFTC 12.4 12.0 7.3 10.6 -5.1 -3.5 -1.3 -3.3
(3) WFTC and child IS w/ 70% withdrawal 2.1 1.4 -0.4 1.0 -2.6 -2.2 -0.8 -1.9
Post-reform education choice
(4) WFTC and child IS 3.8 3.3 -2.8 1.4 -5.9 -4.5 -3.0 -4.4
(5) WFTC 12.4 11.8 4.3 9.5 -5.1 -3.6 -2.1 -3.6
(6) WFTC and child IS w/ 70% withdrawal 2.1 1.1 -3.6 -0.1 -2.6 -2.3 -1.7 -2.2
Notes: Based on simulated data. Reforms are not revenue neutral. E↵ects from comparisons with baseline tax and benefit system.
Rows 1 and 4 show the e↵ects of a joint reform of in-work and out-of-work benefits: (i) the family credit as in 1999 is replaced by
the WFTC as it 2002 and (ii) the child component of IS as in 1999 is replace by the more generous level adopted in 2002. Rows 2
and 5 single out the e↵ect of replacing replacing FC as in 1999 by WFTC as in 2002. Rows 3 and 6 impose the 1999 withdrawal
rate (70%) on the joint reform in rows 1 and 4. Rows 1 to 3 display the e↵ects if education is kept at pre-reform levels. Rows 4 to 6
allow for education choices to adjust to the new incentives. Columns 1 to 4 show e↵ects for single mothers by education. Columns
5 to 8 show e↵ects for mothers in couples. The three levels of education are secondary (‘sec’, columns 1 and 5), further (‘furth’,
columns 2 and 6) and college or university (‘high’, columns 3 and 7).
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Comparing Tables 10 and 7 we see the impact of adjusting the basic tax rate to maintain
revenue neutrality. Not surprisingly there is no impact, on average, for the lower educated.
But for those with higher education qualifications, the impact on employment is more positive
if the reform is not revenue neutral. Similarly, the e↵ects are decreased when we allow changes
in educational investments.
7.2 Welfare and Risk
Finally, in Table 11 we turn to the impact on life-cycle earnings and welfare. Even for those
with the lowest education there is a negative impact of the WFTC and IS reform on gross
life-cycle earnings (row 1, column 1). This turns positive once transfers are accounted for
(row 2, column 1), but remains negative for those with higher educational investments (row 2,
columns 2 and 3). In contrast turning to overall welfare, the impact is positive and strongest
for the lower educated.
To understand this welfare e↵ect it is informative to see the importance of the insurance
value of the tax and benefit system, especially for those with lower education levels. This is
examined in Figure 10, where we consider the consumption value of uncertainty in the wage
rates. There we show the willingness to pay for changes in the variance of wages (risk). A
positive number indicates that the individual would be willing to pay (give up consumption)
for the corresponding level of uncertainty. The lines intersect at the baseline level of risk.
The key result here is that the lowest education group is so well insured by the public programs
that they are willing to tolerate more uncertainty because they are protected against negative
wage shocks by the tax and benefit system; on the other hand they gain from positive shocks.
The middle group is also well insured following the reform, as they are indi↵erent between the
baseline level of uncertainty and increases (although they would prefer less risk). The higher
education group is unlikely to become eligible for welfare benefits, even following a negative
wage shock; as a result they find increases in uncertainty costly. However, overall the reforms
increased the amount of available insurance for most people in the economy, which underlies
the increases in overall welfare.
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Table 11: Impact of WFTC and Child IS revenue neutral reform on life-cycle earnings and
welfare
Pre-reform education choice Post-reform education choice
by baseline educ by baseline educ
sec further higher all sec further higher all
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Lifetime gross earnings -.97 -1.02 -.70 -.89 -1.23 -1.48 -3.25 -1.99
(2) Lifetime disposable income .63 -.85 -1.7 -.6 .11 -1.76 -4.15 -1.93
(3) Welfare (post-education) 2.06 .53 -1.0 .53 1.69 -.32 -1.66 -.10
(4) Welfare (pre-education) .16
Notes: All values measure the impact of the joint WFTC and IS child reform as compared with the baseline (1999) tax
and benefit system. Reform is revenue neutral to keep public budget at the same level as baseline (1999). Rows 1 and
2 display e↵ects on pre- and post- tax lifetime income, respectively. Rows 3 and 4 show e↵ects on welfare measured
by the willingness to pay in consumption terms to keep pre-reform wellbeing with post-reform family budget. These
are measured at the beginning of working life (row 3) and at the start of life (row 4). The values of consumption
compensation displayed in rows 3 and 4 are the solution to the equation:
EV0 = E
X
t
 a A
((1  r)c1a/n1a)µ
µ
exp {f(l1a, X1a) + ✓(l1a)}
where the index 0/1 stands for the pre/post-reform solutions and the value function is evaluated at di↵erent stages in
life for di↵erent rows. The equation can be solved for r, yielding:
r = 1 
✓
EV0
EV1
◆ 1
µ
.
Columns 1 to 3 display e↵ects if education is kept at pre-reform levels. Columns 4 to 6 allow for education choices to
adjust to the new incentives.
7.3 Comparing alternative policies
Income support, tax credits and taxation are all policies that change work incentives, re-
distribute income and, to varying degrees, insure individuals against adverse income shocks.
While we do not propose to address broader design questions, we can look at the welfare e↵ects
of marginal changes in the existing design. In Table 12 we examine the impact of distributing
an unfunded increase in government expenditure equal in all cases to a 0.5% gross earnings in
the economy (before any changes, for the economy under the 1999 tax and benefits system).
The alternatives we consider are a decrease in the basic tax rate, an increase in the maximal
tax credits award or an increase in income support, all costing exactly the same. The notes to
the table give the resulting changes in the tax rate, or the tax credit or income support with
37
Table 12: Impacts of an exogenous increase in public spending distributed through alternative
routes
Pre-reform education choice Post-reform education choice
by baseline educ by baseline educ
sec further higher all sec further higher all
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Adjustment in basic tax rate
(1) Lifetime gross earnings .29 .21 .09 .20 .63 .23 .10 .32
(2) Lifetime disposable income .57 .74 .90 .74 .72 .79 .95 .82
(3) Welfare (post-education) .40 .94 .77 .71 .42 .98 .81 .74
(4) Welfare (pre-education) .68
Panel B: Adjustment in tax credits maximum award
(5) Lifetime gross earnings 1.32 -.01 -.18 .37 .95 -.13 -1.04 -.07
(6) Lifetime disposable income 1.66 .61 .03 .77 1.15 .30 -.57 .29
(7) Welfare (post-education) 1.58 1.30 .21 1.03 1.11 .91 .15 .72
(8) Welfare (pre-education) .78
Panel C: Adjustment in IS award
(9) Lifetime gross earnings -2.49 -1.34 -.38 -1.40 -2.05 -1.16 -.89 -1.36
(10) Lifetime disposable income -.32 -.48 -.21 -.34 -.27 -.45 -.51 -.41
(11) Welfare (post-education) .90 .70 .09 .56 .72 .55 .07 .45
(12) Welfare (pre-education) .46
Notes: The values measure the impact of exogenously increasing public spending by 0.5% of total gross earnings and distributing
it through a drop in the basic tax rate (panel A), an increase in the tax credits maximum award (panel B) and an increase in
the IS award (panel C). All comparisons are against the 1999 tax and benefits system.
Columns 1 to 4 display results when education choices are kept unchanged, in which case the extra spending allows for the
basic tax rate to drop by 0.93pp, the IS award to increase by £4.2 per week, or the tax credits award to increase by £22.2 per
week. Columns 5 to 8 display results when education choices can adjust to the new system, in which case the extra spending
allows for the basic tax rate to drop by 0.97pp, the IS award to increase by £3.4 per week, or the tax credits award to increase
by £16.6 per week.
Rows 1 and 2 (as well as 5-6 and 9-10) display e↵ects on pre- and post- tax lifetime income, respectively. Rows 3 and 4 (as
well as 7-8 and 11-12) display e↵ects on welfare measured by the willingness to pay in consumption terms to keep pre-reform
wellbeing with the post-reform family budget. These are measured at the beginning of working life (rows 3, 7 and 11) and at
the start of life (row 4, 8 and 12). See footnote to table 11 for more details.
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Figure 10: Willingness to pay in consumption terms: value of risk by education
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Notes: Based on simulated data using the 1999 tax and benefit system. Lines show willingness
to pay in consumption terms for a change in uncertainty induced by the variance of women’s
wage innovation changing by a varying factor (x-axis). All values computed under for families
living in own accommodation. Consumption compensation calculated at entrance in working
life.
and without a response of education.
The results will reflect trade-o↵s between incentive e↵ects (distorting labor supply decisions)
and the insurance properties of the various programs. If we do not allow education to adjust,
the clear winner among the programs are tax credits where on average individuals are willing
to pay 1.03% of consumption (row 7). The second preferred alternative is a tax cut with a
willingness to pay of 0.71% of consumption (row 3). The least preferred program is income
support with a willingness to pay of 0.56% (row 11). This continues to be the case when
we allow education to adjust but the outcome is tighter in between tax credits and tax cuts,
whether we look at ex-ante welfare before the education choice or ex-post. In all cases the
distortionary nature of income support, with its 100% marginal tax rate, makes it the least
preferable program despite its basic insurance property (it provides a strong income floor).
Of course, this relates to marginal changes and the result could be very di↵erent if we were
considering large changes.
Interesting insights can be obtained by looking at the willingness to pay of individual education
groups: the highest education group prefers tax cuts to either tax credit changes or income
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support; the latter is valued close to zero by this group. The lowest group prefers an increase
in tax credits, with the second best option for them being income support and tax cuts being
the least preferred option. Interestingly for the middle education group (based on pre-reform
classification) the relative preference between tax credits and tax cuts depends on whether
education choices are allowed to adjust, with tax credits being preferred if education does not
adjust and the reverse when it does. They rank increases in income support lowest, but value
it much more than the highest education group. Interestingly from the perspective of one who
has not yet chosen education (and hence who only knows their ability (✓l) increases in tax
credits are the most preferred policy, followed by tax cuts and the least preferable policy is an
increase in income support (rows 8, 4 and 12 respectively).
The Table also reports changes in gross and net income reflecting changes in work behavior and
benefit receipt as a result of the marginal increases in the benefit. These reveal large negative
impacts of increases in income support on work income. On the other hand tax credits increase
work income for this group. Thus tax credits seem to achieve both an increase in welfare and
a decline in welfare dependency and worklessness.
8 Conclusions
While empirical work has emphasized the importance of tax and welfare on incentives to
work, the longer term e↵ects of such policies have been neglected. In particular, policies that
change the return to education and work may a↵ect the amount of human capital accumulated,
with important consequences for output, employment and, ultimately, welfare. On the other
hand, such welfare programs o↵er valuable insurance against adverse shocks and may also
reduce poverty rates among both the unemployed and the low wage earners. In this paper we
develop a life-cycle model of women’s labour supply, human capital formation (including both
education choice and work experience) and savings that allows us to consider these trade-o↵s
and understand better the longer term e↵ects of policy.
In our model decisions are taken in an uncertain dynamic environment under credit constraints.
The model includes important features brought together for the first time. First, the dynamic
process of family formation is explicitly accounted for. Second, a detailed description of the
policy environment is used to accurately determine net earnings by employment status. The
model is estimated on a long household panel survey for the UK. Many important empirical
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features are closely reproduced, including the empirically estimated short-run e↵ects of the
tax credit and income support reforms of the late 1990s. We compute intensive and extensive
margin elasticities of labor supply, showing the di↵erence between Marshallian and Frisch
labor supply elasticities. We then use the model to study the impact of tax and welfare
benefit reforms on employment, family income and education decisions. We also investigate
the insurance value of redistributive policies.
Our results show that labor supply elasticities can be substantial both on the intensive and the
extensive margins, and even more so for single mothers. As a result, tax and benefit reform has
important incentive and welfare e↵ects. We also show that there is substantial depreciation
of human capital out of work and that valuable labor market experience is only gained in
full time (as opposed to part-time) work. Finally, individuals on the margin change their
education choices in response to welfare reforms, such as tax-credits, that change substantially
the returns to education. As such policies become permanent features of the policy landscape,
their benefits in terms of insurance and poverty reduction need to be weighed against changes
in incentives and human capital accumulation, including education choice.
We also quantify the marginal welfare gains of tax cuts, tax credits and income support.
While preferences for the alternative programs vary among education groups overall tax credits
are preferred to tax cuts and the least welfare enhancing policy (on the margin) is income
support, which carries an implicit 100% marginal tax rate. Perhaps not unexpectedly the
lowest education group prefers tax credits to tax cuts, while the highest education group the
reverse.
While the insurance and anti-poverty value of such benefit systems is substantial, policy may
need to be designed to counteract the ill-e↵ects on education and human capital accumulation
that, in itself, can have important longer term impacts in many aspects of life, including the
intergenerational transmission of poverty as well as on crime.
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Appendix A: Data
Estimation is based on the first 16 yearly waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
covering the period from 1991 to 2006. Apart from those who are lost through attrition, all
families in the original 1991 sample and subsequent booster samples remain in the panel from
then onwards. Other individuals have been added to the sample in subsequent periods —
sometimes temporarily — as they formed families with original interviewees or were born to
them. All members of the household aged 16 and above are interviewed.
We select the sample of women in all types of family arrangements observed at least for 2
consecutive years while aged 17 to 50. Our full dataset is an unbalanced panel of just over
4,100 women aged observed for some varying period during the years 1991 to 2006. 10% of these
women are observed over the whole period, 60% in no more than 6 consecutive waves, 24% are
observed entering the working life from education. A great deal of information is collected for
them, including family demographics, their employment, working hours and earnings as well
as those of a present partner, background characteristics such as age and education, demand
for childcare and its cost. We also keep assets for women aged 17-18 if present (observed for
562 women).
Some definitional and data preparation procedures should be mentioned for clarity. Employ-
ment is determined by present labour market status and excludes self-employment. Self-
employed women at any point in the observation window were excluded from the sample.
We consider employment choices from the age of 19 for women with compulsory and further
education, and from the age of 22 for women with higher education.
Working hours refer to the usual hours in main job including overtime. We discretised labour
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supply using a three-point distribution: not working (0 hours per week), working part-time
(1-20 hours per week) and working full-time (21 hours or more per week). The employment
status and working hours observed at one point in the year are assumed to remain unaltered
over the entire year.
Earnings are the usual gross weekly earnings in the main job. (Hourly) wage rates are the
ratio of weekly earnings by weekly hours capped at 50. Only the central 96% of the earnings
distribution was used for estimation, and only for women working at or above 10 hours per
week to reduce the severity of measurement error in wage rates. Nominal wage rates were
de-trended using the time intercepts of a regression of log wages on time dummies and log
experience. The time intercepts were then used to build a nominal wage index and deflate the
monetary parameters of the tax and benefit system.
Family type is classified in four groups: single women and couples without children, single
women and couples with children. Women are assumed to have children only after finishing
education, once entering the labour market. Cumulated working experience is measured in
years. Individual assets at the beginning of adult life are the total of savings and investments
net of debts. They are truncated at zero, never allowed to be negative. Education is classified
in 3 categories: secondary or compulsory (completed by the age of 16), further (corresponding
to A-levels or equivalent qualifications) and higher (university or college).
Cohort e↵ects were removed from all data moments using a fourth degree polynomial in age
and cohort.
Appendix B: Externally estimated parameters
Externally set parameters Two parameters are chosen from pre-existing estimates: the
coe cient, µ, set to -0.56 giving a risk aversion coe cient of 1.56 (consistent with evidence
in Blundell, Browning and Meghir, 1993, and Attanasio and Weber, 1995), and the discount
factor,  , set to 0.98 (a typical value in the literature, see e.g. Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-
Marcos, 2008). Moreover, the risk-free interest rate is set to 0.015, which is slightly lower than
the discount rate thus implying that agents have some degree of impatience; tuition cost of
university education amounts to GBP 3,000 for the three years program and the credit limit
for university students (and graduates throughout their life) is GBP 5,000, both reflecting
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the university education policy of the late nineties in the UK. For everyone else, credit is
constrained.
Family transitions Family transition probabilities were estimated using linear probability
regressions, weighted to ensure an equal number of women at each age. The probability of a
partner arriving is estimated by regressing a dummy for partner arrival on age and age squared
among single women aged 55 or less. This is done separately for each of the nine combinations
of female and partner education level. Arrival probabilities in the first period of working life are
taken directly from the data, and subsequent probabilities are restricted to be non-increasing
after age 35 and zero from age 50 (or if negative). The probability of a partner leaving is
estimated by regressing a dummy for partner departure on age and age squared among women
aged 20–69. This is done separately for each of the three partner education levels (but not
female education levels) and, up to age 45, by whether the family has any children.
The probability of a child arriving is estimated by regressing a dummy for child arrival on an
order 2 polynomial in female age and, for families with older children, an order 2 polynomial
in age of next youngest child and a linear interaction with female age. This is done separately
for each female education level and by couple status, and regressions only include women aged
42 or less.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of family composition by female age and education for both
observed data and model simulations. The displayed simulated profiles are reasonably close
to the observed data ones. They show that less educated women are more likely to become
mothers early on and to experienced lone-motherhood than more educated women.
Male employment and earnings Table 13 reports the estimates for male working status
and earnings by male education. This is relevant only when the woman lives in a couple as
we do not solve the male’s problem, but we use this equation to draw male income for the
budget constraint and male employment status for preferences and child care costs. Rows 1 to 3
display estimates from a probit regression and show that the employment probability generally
increases with education and depends strongly on past employment (row 3). Estimates for the
log wage equation suggest only mild di↵erences in wage rates by education (row 4) but strong
di↵erences in wage progression, with more educated men experiencing steeper wage profiles
over time (row 5). We set the autocorrelation coe cient in the male productivity process
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Figure 11: Family demographics by female age - data and simulations
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to 0.99, close to a unit root. Estimates of the selection parameter (mills ratio in row 8) are
imprecisely estimated and we assume no correlation between the residuals in the selection and
wage equations.
Table 13: Exogenous parameters: married men employment and wage rates by education
Man’s education
secondary further higher
Employment probabilities
(1) new couples 0.75 0.88 0.85
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
(2) ongoing couples: intercept -0.94 -0.50 -0.25
(0.05) (0.07) (0.13)
(3) ongoing couples: previously employed 2.71 2.47 2.37
(0.06) (0.08) (0.16)
Log wage equation
(4) log wage rates 1.72 1.83 1.79
(0.47) (0.18) (0.33)
(5) log woman’s age minus 18 0.05 0.12 0.25
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
all education groups
(6) dispersion productivity (new couples) 0.40
(0.10)
(7) dispersion innovation in productivity (ongoing couples) 0.07
(0.03)
(8) mills ratio 0.25
(1.13)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis below the estimate. Sample sizes are: 346 observations for new couples, 8461
observations for ongoing couples, 7386 observations for working married men.
Childcare costs Families with positive childcare costs when all adults in the household are
working pay £2.09 (standard error is 0.04) per working hour. Childcare is required for all
working hours of mothers if the child is 4 or younger, and is only necessary for oder children
under the age of 10 if the mother works full-time.
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Appendix C: Computational details on the solution and
estimation of the model
The estimation and simulation exercises involve solving the life-cycle model conditional on
all exogenous characteristics, including initial assets, preferences for working and education,
the dynamics of family demographics, the random productivity processes for both women and
men, and whether the woman faces positive childcare costs. The model is a finite horizon one,
hence requiring the solution to be computed for each period (which we take to be a year) as a
function of the entire state space (described by X at the start of section 2.2). We do this by
backward recursion, starting from the end of life (age 70).
We discretize the domain of all continuous state variables to reduce the computational size
of the problem. At each period of life, and for each point in the state variables’ grid, the
solution is computed in two steps: (1) solving the Euler equation for the optimal level of
consumption conditional on labor supply and (2) choosing the labour supply that maximizes
the value of present and (expected) future utility. To evaluate tomorrow’s expected marginal
utility of consumption (to solve for the Euler equation) and expected utility (to choose optimal
labour supply) at points outside tomorrow’s grid, we use linear interpolation on approximate
linearizations of the expected functions on assets. These are the inverses of the marginal
utility of consumption (for the expected marginal utility) and of the instantaneous utility
function (for the expected continuation value). The grid in assets is finer for values closer
to its lower bound as the linearizations become less precise with the increased probability of
the budget constraint binding in the future. Depending on family circumstances and age,
we take expectations over up to 5 unobserved variables to compute the continuation value
and the expected marginal utility of consumption. These include female productivity, couple
formation/dissolution, partner’s education and productivity and child arrival. We use a 5-
dimensional transition matrix, discretizing the domain of the continuous productivity shocks
in 12 equal-probability intervals.
The estimation procedure is implemented as an iterative process in four steps. The first step
involves solving the female life-cycle problem for a particular set of the estimating parame-
ters, given the economic environment and the adopted exogenously set parameters. We then
simulated the life-cycle choices of 22,780 women in step 2, using the observed distribution of
initial assets, and select an observation window for each so that the overall simulated sample
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reproduces the time and age structure of the observed data (this is described in section 6.1).
The simulations assume women are exposed to up to three policy regimes over the observation
window, representing the main tax and benefits systems operating during the 90s and early
00s (we adopted the 1995, 2000 and 2004 regimes and assumed they operated over the periods
prior to 1998, 1998 to 2002 and 2003 onwards, respectively). For simulation purposes, all
reforms arrive unexpectedly. Step 3 computes the estimation moments using the simulated
dataset and calculates the objective function (which is the sum of squared standard deviation
di↵erences between data and simulated moments). Step 4 compares the di↵erence against a
pre-established tolerance and re-optimizes (selects new set of estimation parameters) in case
the convergence criterion is not met.
Appendix D: Model fit
Tables 14 to 19 display the full list of data moments used in estimation, together with their
simulated counterparts an the normalized (by the data standard error) di↵erences between the
two. The estimation procedure was based on 180 moments, including employment rates in
Table 14, part-time employment rates in Table 15, transition rates between employment and
unemployment by level of wages in Table 16, coe cients from wage regressions, year-to-year
change in wage rates by labour market activity and percentiles of the wage distribution in
Table 17, moments of the initial distribution of wage rates in Table 18, and the population
distribution of education and positive childcare costs in Table 19. All moments are education-
specific.
Among the 180 simulated moments, 36 fall outside the 95% confidence interval for the respec-
tive data moment. We found the distribution of wage rates among part-time workers to be
particularly di cult to reproduce, possibly a result of severe measurement error in working
hours at the bottom of its distribution (bottom panel of Table 17). Measurement error in the
distribution of hours, even if classical, results in upward biased measures of the wage rates as
these are not directly observed and, instead, computed as the ratio of earned income to hours.
The e↵ect is more severe at the bottom of the distribution of hours, thus particularly a↵ecting
the distribution of wage rates among part-time workers.
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Table 14: Model fit – female employment rates by family composition and education
secondary further higher
data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Single women
all 0.60 0.59 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.57 0.92 0.95 2.29
mothers 0.40 0.43 1.13 0.66 0.61 1.36 0.91 0.81 2.95
mothers: child age 0-2 0.17 0.23 2.53 0.31 0.39 1.36 0.73 0.56 1.10
mothers: child age 3-5 0.31 0.39 2.58 0.57 0.57 0.15 0.76 0.78 0.11
mothers: child age 6-10 0.48 0.49 0.13 0.74 0.66 1.67 0.94 0.85 1.44
mothers: child age 11-18 0.61 0.60 0.22 0.89 0.79 2.56 0.99 0.92 3.19
Married women
all 0.68 0.65 2.26 0.80 0.79 0.58 0.89 0.88 0.33
mothers 0.60 0.60 0.45 0.71 0.73 1.33 0.83 0.85 0.77
mothers: child age 0-2 0.40 0.35 2.20 0.58 0.54 1.64 0.77 0.75 0.60
mothers: child age 3-5 0.54 0.58 1.63 0.70 0.73 1.16 0.81 0.86 1.38
mothers: child age 6-10 0.69 0.70 0.32 0.79 0.81 1.12 0.92 0.90 0.63
mothers: child age 11-18 0.77 0.75 1.43 0.87 0.88 0.45 0.91 0.94 0.69
partner working 0.74 0.71 2.46 0.81 0.83 1.88 0.89 0.90 0.79
Notes: Values in columns 1, 4 and 7 are data moments. Columns 2, 5 and 8 report the corresponding simulated moments
and columns 3, 6, and 9 report the standard error distance between the two sets of moments using the data standard errors.
Statistically significant di↵erences at the typical 5% level correspond to figures above 2 in columns 3, 6, and 9.
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Table 15: Model fit – female part-time employment rates for women by family composition
and education
secondary further higher
data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Single women
all 0.11 0.10 1.23 0.07 0.05 1.95 0.03 0.01 1.52
mothers 0.17 0.18 0.91 0.14 0.16 1.04 0.05 0.09 1.10
mothers: child age 0-2 0.12 0.16 1.66 0.11 0.17 2.08 0.16 0.11 0.42
mothers: child age 3-5 0.20 0.34 3.92 0.19 0.35 4.03 0.15 0.24 0.84
mothers: child age 6-10 0.20 0.13 3.06 0.17 0.10 1.63 0.11 0.07 0.51
mothers: child age 11-18 0.15 0.12 1.17 0.09 0.07 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.03
Married women
all 0.18 0.19 1.12 0.15 0.16 0.60 0.11 0.11 0.21
mothers 0.23 0.23 0.47 0.22 0.21 0.50 0.17 0.15 0.91
mothers: child age 0-2 0.20 0.14 4.34 0.23 0.16 4.75 0.20 0.12 2.39
mothers: child age 3-5 0.27 0.35 4.82 0.27 0.36 3.72 0.22 0.26 1.00
mothers: child age 6-10 0.28 0.29 0.84 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.36
mothers: child age 11-18 0.20 0.17 1.91 0.12 0.11 0.53 0.06 0.08 0.34
partner working 0.20 0.21 1.06 0.15 0.16 0.97 0.11 0.11 0.05
Notes: Values in columns 1, 4 and 7 are data moments. Columns 2, 5 and 8 report the corresponding simulated moments
and columns 3, 6, and 9 report the standard error distance between the two sets of moments using the data standard errors.
Statistically significant di↵erences at the typical 5% level correspond to figures above 2 in columns 3, 6, and 9.
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Table 16: Model fit – transition probabilities between unemployment and employment by
family composition and education
secondary further higher
data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Single women
U to E 0.13 0.17 4.18 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.53 0.33 2.19
E to U 0.07 0.07 0.76 0.04 0.02 3.45 0.02 0.01 1.90
E to U: wt 1 < p10 0.13 0.10 1.52 0.10 0.07 1.06 0.01 0.05 9.91
E to U: wt 1 < p50 0.09 0.08 0.59 0.07 0.04 2.93 0.04 0.03 0.67
E to U: wt 1 < p90 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.04 0.03 3.18 0.02 0.01 1.57
Married women
U to E 0.14 0.14 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.82 0.24 0.22 0.48
E to U 0.06 0.08 7.21 0.04 0.05 0.55 0.03 0.03 0.55
E to U: wt 1 < p10 0.12 0.15 1.57 0.12 0.14 0.62 0.05 0.20 1.10
E to U: wt 1 < p50 0.06 0.10 4.52 0.06 0.08 2.72 0.04 0.09 3.28
E to U: wt 1 < p90 0.05 0.08 5.03 0.04 0.05 1.64 0.03 0.04 0.79
Notes: Women only. Values in columns 1, 4 and 7 are data moments. Columns 2, 5 and 8 report the corresponding
simulated moments and columns 3, 6, and 9 report the standard error distance between the two sets of moments using
the data standard errors. Statistically significant di↵erences at the typical 5% level correspond to figures above 2 in
columns 3, 6, and 9. U stands for unemployment, E for employment, wt 1 is the female wage rate in period t  1, and
pq is the qth quantile of the distribution of female wage rates.
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Table 17: Model fit – wage regressions and the distribution of female wage rates by education
secondary further higher
data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log wage regression in first di↵erences
log experience 0.10 0.11 0.46 0.12 0.19 4.54 0.17 0.21 1.68
autocorr of residuals 0.96 0.92 1.81 0.95 0.94 0.64 0.92 0.89 1.11
var of innovation 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.42
Annual change in log earnings by past employment status
full-time employment 0.02 0.01 1.26 0.02 0.01 1.78 0.03 0.01 2.37
part-time employment -0.03 -0.00 3.32 -0.06 -0.01 5.95 -0.01 -0.01 0.74
unemployment -0.02 -0.01 0.27 -0.04 -0.03 1.14 -0.05 -0.03 1.19
Distribution of log wage rates among full-time working women
mean 1.85 1.84 1.28 2.07 2.08 0.91 2.36 2.40 1.37
proportion below p10 0.10 0.11 1.57 0.10 0.08 1.69 0.10 0.05 6.08
proportion below p25 0.25 0.25 0.12 0.25 0.24 0.47 0.25 0.20 1.90
proportion below p50 0.50 0.51 0.30 0.50 0.49 0.04 0.50 0.49 0.15
proportion below p75 0.75 0.75 0.16 0.75 0.76 0.29 0.75 0.75 0.14
proportion below p90 0.90 0.90 0.14 0.90 0.89 0.11 0.90 0.89 0.15
Distribution of log wage rates among part-time working women
mean 1.69 1.69 0.00 1.95 1.81 5.49 2.27 2.10 4.18
proportion below p10 0.10 0.08 1.80 0.10 0.10 1.24 0.10 0.05 5.38
proportion below p25 0.25 0.20 2.39 0.25 0.26 0.62 0.25 0.32 4.02
proportion below p50 0.50 0.43 1.78 0.50 0.64 4.27 0.50 0.78 7.92
proportion below p75 0.75 0.76 0.31 0.75 0.91 3.15 0.75 0.96 3.99
proportion below p90 0.90 0.94 0.75 0.90 0.98 1.37 0.90 0.99 1.37
Notes: Values in columns 1, 4 and 7 are data moments. Columns 2, 5 and 8 report the corresponding simulated moments
and columns 3, 6, and 9 report the standard error distance between the two sets of moments using the data standard errors.
Statistically significant di↵erences at the typical 5% level correspond to figures above 2 in columns 3, 6, and 9. qth quantile of
the distribution of female wage rates.
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Table 18: Model fit – female initial wage rate by education
secondary further higher
data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Distribution of log wage rates among full-time working women
mean 1.63 1.61 1.30 1.62 1.61 0.47 1.89 1.93 1.49
variance 0.08 0.06 2.89 0.07 0.06 1.23 0.11 0.09 1.33
proportion below p25 0.25 0.31 2.30 0.25 0.27 1.35 0.25 0.21 1.43
proportion below p75 0.75 0.73 0.64 0.75 0.83 3.83 0.75 0.79 1.78
Notes: Values in columns 1, 4 and 7 are data moments. Columns 2, 5 and 8 report the corresponding simulated moments
and columns 3, 6, and 9 report the standard error distance between the two sets of moments using the data standard errors.
Statistically significant di↵erences at the typical 5% level correspond to figures above 2 in columns 3, 6, and 9. pq is the
qth quantile of the distribution of female wage rates.
Table 19: Model fit – other moments by education
secondary further higher
data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵ data sim SE di↵
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
distribution of education 0.30 0.30 0.01 0.47 0.47 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.00
prob positive CC cost 0.29 0.30 0.44 0.40 0.37 1.21 0.41 0.40 0.26
Notes: Women only. Values in columns 1, 4 and 7 are data moments. Columns 2, 5 and 8 report the corresponding simulated
moments and columns 3, 6, and 9 report the standard error distance between the two sets of moments using the data standard
errors. Statistically significant di↵erences at the typical 5% level correspond to figures above 2 in columns 3, 6, and 9. CC
stands for childcare.
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